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credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent 
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associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less 
likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based 
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1. Introduction
Hedge funds face limited monitoring from regulators, and their complex investment
strategies and opaque disclosures make it hard for their investors to monitor them. Moreover,
share restrictions such as lockup periods make it difficult for investors to “vote with their feet”
by withdrawing their capital. These characteristics provide fertile ground for agency conflicts
to emerge between hedge fund managers and investors. Despite the fact that funds collectively
manage over $3.4 trillion dollars in assets (SEC Division of Investment Management, 2015)
and several recent studies document hedge fund misbehavior1, we know relatively little about
how funds are governed so as to assure investors can expect a return on their investment.
In this paper, we examine the role that boards of directors play in the governance of hedge
funds.
Hedge fund directors have a legal obligation to monitor the fund manager and serve as an
advocate for investor rights. However, because directors are appointed by the fund manager,
critics raise concerns that directors may simply be “rubber-stamps” that serve nothing more
than a perfunctory role in fulfilling regulatory requirements to have a board. This view
has gained popularity following a wave of scandals during the recent financial crisis, where
several directors were accused of breaching their fiduciary duties to properly monitor funds
that engaged in misconduct and fraud.2 Consequently, several media reports questioned the
independence and monitoring capability of hedge fund boards.3 Despite this increased media
attention, an empirical study of hedge fund boards is notably absent from the literature.
This paper is a first step toward filling this gap. To do so, we take advantage of a recent
1See for example, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011); Bollen and Pool (2009, 2012); Dimmock and Gerken
(2016); Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2015); Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2015)
2“Former Bear Stearns Managers Face Criminal Charges”, Bloomberg, June 2008;
“The Other Offshore Disaster”, New York Times, June 2010;
“Weavering Capital Collapses Over Derivatives Position”, Financial Times, March 2009
3“In Caymans, It’s Simple to Fill a Hedge Fund Board”, New York Times, July 2012;
“Hedge Funds Are Not Like Banks”, New York Magazine, July 2012
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disclosure law that forces hedge funds to electronically report their board membership to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We use these SEC filings to build a database
comprised of 5,400 different directors for 5,126 hedge funds over the period 2009-2013.
We begin by documenting several stylized facts about hedge fund boards. Unlike public
corporations and mutual funds, hedge funds face few governance regulations and thus offer an
interesting setting to understand how market forces shape board structure. In most cases, a
hedge fund’s board would be compliant with regulations if it had just two inside directors (i.e.,
fund owners, employees, or related parties) and no outside directors. If the role of hedge fund
boards was simply to comply with regulations, then we would expect to see limited variation
in board structure, few outside directors, and significant clustering around regulatory minima.
Strikingly, the data plainly contradict this “compliance” hypothesis. We find considerable
cross sectional variation in the size and structure of hedge fund boards. In fact, despite the
lack of independence requirements, outside directors are more common than inside directors
and, though most boards have only three directors, nearly 80% have at least one outside
director.
Another interesting pattern emerges when we examine the workloads of these outside
directors. Namely, the majority of outside directors sit on relatively few boards, yet the
majority of directorships are held by a relatively small yet busy cadre of professional directors,
each of whom hold more than twenty directorships at one time. The media point to these
busy directors as evidence that hedge fund board governance is perfunctory- such a heavy
workload must preclude directors from devoting the time and attention necessary to protect
investors.4 In this paper, we put forth an alternative explanation for the busyness of hedge
fund directors based on the concepts of director reputation and certification.
Investor concerns over agency problems and withdrawal restrictions motivate hedge funds
4“Fund Jumbo Directors and Their Many Seats”, Financial Times, November 2011
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to hire credible, independent monitors to help certify their quality and encourage outside
investment. However, because fund managers hire them, directors need an external source
of credibility in order to help convince investors that they are appropriately monitoring the
manager. The labor market should reward higher quality directors with more directorships,
and busier directors have more reputational capital to lose if they neglect their fiduciary
duties by “rubber-stamping” the decisions of the fund manager. Additionally, directors that
work for many different fund advisers are less beholden to any single employer, making them
more independent from fund management. Thus, we hypothesize that directors can derive
their credibility from the director labor market, meaning that the busyness of a director can
serve as a proxy for his quality, reputational capital, and independence from management.
To test this theory, we first examine the relation between a director’s reputation and
his future job prospects. We find that the probability a director is appointed to a new
directorship is strongly and positively related to the number of other directorships he holds.
Additionally, directors are hired more often if they served on the boards of better performing
funds and less often if they served on the board of a failed fund. Collectively, these results
are consistent with the theory that funds are attracted to directors that have developed
stronger reputations in the director labor market. In contrast, we find several results which
are inconsistent with the rubber-stamp theory that funds prefer directors that are too busy
to monitor them. Specifically, we find there is diminishing returns to director busyness,
suggesting capacity costs are a real concern for directors. Moreover, funds are more likely to
hire directors with more fund-specific human capital and lower monitoring costs, indicating
funds and directors match in such a way as to mitigate capacity costs.
Another way that hedge fund directors increase their workload capacity is by working
for professional directorship firms that employ several directors and a support staff. The
majority of directorships are held by affiliates of a directorship firm, and this institutional
structure appears unique to the hedge fund directorship market. Firm-affiliated directors
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have access to shared resources and technologies that create economies of scale and reduce
the marginal cost of monitoring each fund. Busier directors are substantially more likely
to work for a firm and are also more likely to concurrently serve on the same board with a
colleague from the same firm, reducing the joint workloads of both directors. Working for a
firm can also convey additional reputational benefits to the director, as he is able to associate
with the collective reputation of the firm and its employees (Tirole, 1996). Even when we
control for the director’s individual reputational capital, directors from directorship firms are
more likely to be hired, and this effect is stronger when the firm is more reputable.
We also find evidence of positive assortative matching between high quality directors
seeking to enhance and protect their reputation and high quality funds seeking certification
from a credible outside monitor. Specifically, busier directors are more likely to join the
boards of better performing funds and funds with fewer regulatory violations. Moreover,
funds that lose the certification of a reputable independent director experience a 4.7% outflow
of capital in the quarter of the director’s exit. In contrast, we find no outflow of capital when
a non-independent director exits or when the fund is able to replace a departing independent
director.
We also find evidence that reputable independent directors are better monitors. Specifically,
funds with reputable independent directors are 83% less likely to commit fraud. In addition,
funds with reputable independent directors are less likely to abuse discretionary liquidity
restrictions (commonly known as side pockets or gates) and engage in performance-based
risk shifting. Collectively, our evidence suggests reputable independent directors play an
important monitoring role in hedge fund governance.
As the first, large-scale study to examine hedge fund boards and the market for their
directors, we contribute to the growing literature which examines the various governance
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mechanisms hedge funds use to manage agency conflicts.5 For instance, some studies have
found a positive association between fund misconduct and the quality of internal controls
such as signature processes governing cash transfers, pricing and disclosure practices, and
the quality of service providers such as auditors or administrators (Cassar and Gerakos,
2010; Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz, 2012). Because the board is tasked with
developing and monitoring internal control processes, understanding board quality is necessary
to understanding the source of effective internal controls. Our findings suggest that the
quality of a hedge fund’s board can be measured by the reputation and independence of the
fund’s directors.
In addition, our study is related to the corporate board literature debating the costs and
benefits of director busyness. Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that higher quality directors
will be rewarded by the labor market with more directorships. Consistent with this reasoning,
some studies have used the number of directorships held by a director as a positive indicator
of his reputation(e.g., Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Vafeas, 1999; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011;
Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan, 2013). Our results are more consistent with this bright side
view of director busyness.
However, there is also a potential dark side to director busyness. For example, in their
theory of venture capitalist (VCs) involvement in their portfolio companies Kanniainen and
Keuschnigg (2003) argue that because it is costly for venture capitalists (VCs) to provide
advice to to their portfolio firms, there is an optimal level of busyness, and VCs that become
stretched too thin can actually destroy firm value. Supporting this view, Cumming (2006)
finds that VCs tend to have smaller portfolios when their portfolio companies require more
intensive involvement by the VC. Moreover, Cumming and Walz (2010) find that busy VC
5Some examples include: Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008, 2012), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik
(2009), Cumming and Dai (2010), Dimmock and Gerken (2012), Cumming, Dai, and Johan (2013), Ozik
and Sadka (2014), and Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2015)
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managers tend to have worse performance. There is also evidence of a dark side to busyness
for public corporations. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with a high proportion of
busy directors are associated with weak corporate governance and poor firm performance,
and Yermack (2004) finds that the labor market is less likely to reward busier directors with
additional directorships.
The discrepancies between the findings in our study and studies revealing a dark side to
director busyness could be due to the fact that the latter studies focus on directorships for
typical industrial corporations, which require high firm-specific workloads that dramatically
lower a director’s capacity to effectively manage multiple board positions. This makes a
corporate director’s busyness a poor proxy of his quality, because we do not observe the seats
directors could obtain in the absence of these constraints (e.g., if they had more free time
or could specialize in closely related firms). In contrast to industrial corporations, hedge
funds are relatively homogenous, and the duties of their directors are relatively focused and
standardized. These factors dramatically reduce the required time investment and increase
the scalability of the director’s human capital such that it can be employed efficiently across
many funds.6
2. Data and Institutional Background
2.1. Data Sources
The board data in our paper are collected from SEC Form D filings from EDGAR over
the period of 2009 to 2013.7 All hedge funds seeking to raise capital from U.S. investors
must file a Form D disclosing limited information about the fund and the offering, including
the names and addresses of the fund’s board members. We define a director as being an
6See section 2.3.1 for a further discussion of how hedge fund directors are able to manage heavy workloads.
7The beginning of our sample period coincides with the SEC moving to electronic Form D filings on March
15, 2009. See Ivanov and Bauguess (2012) for a summary of these data.
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insider if the director also lists himself as an executive of the fund, the director discloses a
relationship with the fund, or the director matches to other regulatory filings for the fund.
Otherwise, we classify the director as an outsider. The focus of our study is on this sample of
outside directors. We manually collect background data on outside directors from the Form
D, LinkedIn, web searches, and FundGov, a commercial database that includes biographical
information of hedge fund directors. We combine our director data with two other datasets:
a dataset derived from Form ADV filings and a merged database of the five most widely
used commercial hedge fund databases: LipperTASS, HFR, Morningstar, BarclayHedge, and
Eureka.
2.2. Hedge Fund Boards
Nearly 70% of hedge fund assets are held by offshore corporations (offshore funds) located
in countries such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands. Though
most of these funds are managed by U.S.-based hedge fund advisers, they are located
offshore to serve the U.S. tax-exempt and non-U.S. investor clienteles, both of whom can
receive favorable tax treatment and enhanced privacy when they invest through an offshore
corporation. Offshore funds structured as corporations must comply with corporate and
securities laws in these countries, including the requirement that the fund must have a board
of directors.
To serve the U.S. taxable investor clientele, advisers set up domestic limited partnerships
(onshore funds) to avoid the double taxation that accrues to domestic investors in U.S.
corporations. In a limited partnership, the fund manager serves as the general partner with
full managerial control, and the investors serve as limited partners. Limited partnerships
do not have boards because, by definition, limited partners cannot participate in control
over fund operations. Therefore, tax laws essentially preclude boards in onshore hedge funds,
whereas they essentially force the establishment of boards in offshore hedge funds. Thus, our
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analysis is restricted to the boards of offshore funds.8
In Table 1, we present summary statistics and frequency distributions of board structures
and offshore domiciles for the 5,126 funds in our sample. By far the most common domicile
for offshore hedge funds is the Cayman Islands, which accounts for 79.6% of the sample.
The next two largest domiciles are the British Virgin Islands (7.8%) and Bermuda (4.0%),
respectively. These domiciles impose relatively few regulations regarding the structure of
hedge fund boards, and unlike U.S. public corporations and mutual funds, offshore hedge
funds are not typically required to have any outside directors on their board. In the Cayman
Islands, for example, the only requirement is that boards have at least two directors (inside or
outside). If boards were designed simply to meet the regulatory minimum of their respective
domicile, then we would expect to see limited variation in board structure, few outsiders,
and significant clustering around regulatory minima.
The statistics in Table 1 plainly contradict this “compliance” hypothesis. Despite the
lack of outsider requirements, outside board members are actually more common than inside
board members. From Panel A, we see that the median board has three directors, one of
which is an insider and two of which are outsiders. Indeed, 79.2% of boards have at least
one outside director. Panel B reveals that the two outsider, one insider structure is the most
common board structure, yet it also reveals considerable variation in board structure across
funds.
2.3. Hedge Fund Directors
Although hedge fund board structures are relatively unregulated, hedge fund directors
face fiduciary duties and responsibilities that are shaped by industry standards and domicile
8We note that onshore funds could obtain de facto board governance when they are part of a master-feeder
structure, whereby the onshore fund feeds its assets to an offshore corporate master-fund. This master-feeder
structure is common in the hedge fund industry, and we include the boards of these offshore master funds in
our sample as well.
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common law. Hedge fund directors have a general duty to supervise matters where the
interests of the manager and investors may differ. Directors help establish internal controls,
review and approve the investment advisers’ contracts and fees, and help appoint the fund’s
auditor, custodian, and other third party administrators. The directors also approve certain
actions taken by the fund, such as the valuation of illiquid assets, in-house trades with
the investment adviser, certification of the accuracy of fund information, the granting of
side letters for preferential treatment of certain investors, and approval of discretionary
liquidity restrictions (i.e., gates or side pockets). Despite having these duties, hedge fund
directorships typically require considerably smaller time commitments than directorships of
public corporations and their fees are relatively small ($10,000 to $30,000 per hedge fund
board compared to $227,000 per board for directors of the typical Fortune 500 company
(Tower Watson Survey, 2013). The busiest hedge fund directors are “professional directors”
that derive their primary income from serving as a director on many funds.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the 1,573 outside hedge fund directors in our
sample and reveals several striking facts about the director labor market. Panel A describes
the director’s country of residence. Interestingly, despite the fact that our sample is comprised
of non-U.S. funds by construction, the United States is the most common country of residence
for directors (27.8%). Under a quarter (24.2%) of directors live in the three most popular
fund domiciles (Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda), despite the fact that
over 90% of funds are domiciled in these locations.
Panels B and C of Table 2 summarize director workloads at both the director and direc-
torship level. These panels reveal that the distribution of director workloads is considerably
skewed. In Panel B we see that the average outside director sits on 6.5 boards, while the
average outside directorship is held by a director that sits on 41.0 boards. In Panel C we see
that 67.6% of outsider directors serve on three or fewer funds, which resembles the typical
workload of corporate directors. However, these directors account for only 17.9% of all outside
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directorships. The remaining 82.1% of directorships are held by only 32.4% of the outside
directors. Strikingly the 7.5% of directors that sit on more than twenty boards collectively
hold 51.4% of all outside directorships. Thus, the majority of directorships are held by
directors that are extraordinarily “busy” by typical corporate director standards.
Directors also sit on boards across many different advisers.9 The average outside director-
ship is held by a director that represents 22.7 different advisers. This statistic is pertinent to
the concept of director independence. A director who serves on many boards for the same
adviser is more likely to be co-opted by that adviser, as his collective compensation is derived
from one employer. Thus, we define an outside director to be Independent if he sits on the
boards of funds managed by multiple advisers and the director is not conflicted by providing
other services to the fund such as legal or audit work. Independent directors make up 35.0%
of the outside director population, and hold 78.7% of the outside directorships.10 In our
subsequent analysis we separately examine both the number of funds and the number of
advisers a director works for to highlight the link between multiple adviser associations and
director independence.
2.3.1. How can hedge fund directors manage so many directorships?
Considering that directors of public corporations are often considered “busy” if they
hold more than three directorships (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), it is reasonable to ask how
hedge fund directors can serve so many funds at once. Although hedge funds operate varied
9Hedge funds are managed by an adviser which is essentially an umbrella company that manages several
underlying funds. The analog in mutual funds would be the mutual fund family, such as Fidelity, which
manages several underlying and disparate Fidelity funds, each with their own board. While mutual fund
directors routinely sit on many boards concurrently, these boards are typically on funds within the same
family. For example, three unique directors serve as outside directors across 39 unique Fidelity Select funds.
Each of these directors, however, does not serve across additional mutual fund families, such as Vanguard or
T. Rowe Price.
10One concern is that directors may work with many advisers but all work for the same fund administrator
that has a stable of directors that they place on the fund. In fact, the busiest directors in our sample work
with many service providers, and directors rarely work with only a single service provider of any type.
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investment strategies, from a director’s perspective, hedge funds are far more homogenous
than industrial corporations. Compared to corporate directors, hedge fund directors have a
relatively limited set of duties (such as monitoring valuation and trading practices) which
require similar knowledge to execute across different hedge funds. Moreover, the majority
of agency and regulatory issues facing hedge funds are common across funds, which allow
for economies of scale in monitoring several hedge funds at once. In addition, there are
several unique aspects of the hedge fund directorship market that enable directors to shoulder
ostensibly extreme workloads. We present statistics in Panels D and E that shed light on
some of these institutional details.
In Panel D, we present statistics on director backgrounds from data hand collected from
their LinkedIn profiles. Typically, directors rely on information generated by fund service
providers such as auditors and administrators to evaluate fund management. As we see
in Panel D of Table 2, many directors have a background in fund management (39.1%),
accounting (8.2%), or law (8.5%), which may help them to better process the information
these service providers generate in advance of board meetings. Moreover, repeated interactions
with these providers across different funds may reduce their information acquisition costs
due to familiarity. Thus, once a director acquires the general knowledge required to monitor
hedge funds effectively, it can be applied broadly across multiple directorships more easily
than if he were the director of a public corporation.
Further, hedge fund directors mitigate capacity problems by organizing themselves into
professional service firms (similar to law and accounting firms), whereby the firm employs
several directors, and the fund contracts with the firm to provide director representation on
the board. By being part of a firm, directors have access to shared resources and technologies
that create economies of scale and reduce the marginal cost of monitoring each fund.
The directorship firm, DMS, which is the largest directorship firm headquartered in the
Cayman Islands, provides a useful case study. DMS has over 200 employees, and services over
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800 different funds whose assets total $330 billion. The directors at DMS share a common
support staff which reduces the administrative burden related to servicing each fund. In
addition, DMS employs a variety of technological solutions that the directors use to track
and evaluate hedge fund trading and valuation practices, which they use to make judgments
about fund operations. The costs of technological assets (like a custom software program)
are mainly fixed and can be spread across the firm’s client base. Further, DMS operates
a team-based model, whereby each director is supported by associates working behind the
scenes, and sometimes by another DMS director on the board. Multiple DMS directors may
sit on the same board, which allows them to work as a team, split up tasks, and reduce the
per-person effort required to monitor the fund. Though this firm model is common to the
accounting and legal professions, hedge fund directors are the only directors we are aware of
that organize themselves in this way.
Panel E of Table 2 shows the proportion of directorships held by directors employed by
directorship firms stratified by the busyness of the director. Only 19.8% of directors with
three or fewer directorships work for a firm, whereas 60.2% of directors with four or more
directorships work for a firm. In fact, 81.1% of the busiest directors (directors with over
twenty directorships), work for a directorship firm. This is consistent with the idea that
directorship firms are a means by which busy directors can manage capacity issues. Busier
directors are also much more likely to serve with a teammate, which we define to be the
cases where a director sits on a board concurrently with one or more colleagues from the
same directorship firm. Directors who manage over twenty funds serve with a teammate
42.4% of the time, compared to only 7.0% of the time for directors with three or fewer funds,
suggesting that the team-model is one way in which membership in a directorship firm enables
directors to share and manage heavy workloads.
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3. Reputation and the Labor Market for Hedge Fund Directors
3.1. Hypothesis Development
There are at least three reasons why busier directors should have higher value in the
labor market. First, Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that higher quality directors will be
rewarded by the labor market with more directorships. Thus, the size of a director’s portfolio
of directorships could be a proxy for his quality. Second, a large portfolio of directorships can
also serve as a reputational bonding mechanism. A director that work for more funds has
more to lose by acting in a way that hurts his reputation (i.e., by failing to properly monitor a
fund). Third, directors that work for many managers are less beholden to any single manager,
and thus are more independent from management. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) argue
that outside directors that are appointed by management are likely to be captured by the
very managers they are supposed to be monitoring. However, a director that serves on many
boards has little incentive to cater to a particular manager if in doing so it would tarnish his
reputation. A director who can be credibly perceived by investors as being more independent
could provide valuable certification for the fund. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a Directors are more likely to obtain additional directorships if they have
worked for more funds and more advisers.
In addition to the quantity of directorships, the quality should matter as well. If hedge
funds care about hiring quality directors, then we should see evidence that the labor market
rewards directors for that have worked for better performing funds (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) predict that there can be a substantial devaluation
of human capital if a director develops a poor reputation. Fund failure is a particularly
important risk for hedge fund investors, and performance track records will not include the
impact of fund failure as hedge fund databases can be missing the worst returns of hedge
funds that fail and stop reporting (Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis, 2013; Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang,
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2013). Thus, funds should be less willing to hire directors that worked for a failed fund in
the past.
Hypothesis 1b Funds are more likely to hire directors from better performing funds and
less likely to hire directors that have worked for failed funds.
A third dimension of director reputation comes from the reputation of the directorship
firms. Tirole (1996) theorizes that a group member’s reputation and incentives are affected
by his own past behavior, as well as by the behavior of the group, and vice-versa. Because
the reputation of the group (directorship firm) is influenced by the behavior of the members
(directors), the group has an incentive to monitor each member to ensure that he provides
appropriate product quality (monitoring) and does not adversely impact the group’s collective
reputation. In other words, a director from a firm will not only worry about protecting his
own reputation when carrying out his duties, but will also worry that the firm may fire him
if he shirks his responsibilities. Thus, a hedge fund and its investors can use the directorship
firm’s reputation to infer the expected quality of director services. Moreover, just as the
director’s own reputation is the bonding mechanism that incentivizes his monitoring effort,
the firm’s reputation can act as an additional layer of “skin in the game” that will encourage
the director to provide quality monitoring.
Hypothesis 1c Directors are more likely to obtain new directorships if they work for direc-
torship firms and this effect should be stronger when the director works for more reputable
firms.
3.2. Results: Directorship Appointments
In this section, we test our hypotheses concerning the role of reputation in the market for
directors. In Table 3, we identify the attributes that are related to a director’s propensity to
obtain an additional directorship in the following quarter. We employ a logit model, where
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the dependent variable is equal to one if the director joins at least one additional board in
the subsequent quarter, and zero otherwise. The sample includes all outside directors and
the unit of observation is the director-quarter. In all models, we control for time fixed-effects
and cluster the standard errors by director.
Model 1 reveals that the number of directorships the director currently holds is positively
related to the likelihood that a director acquires a new directorship in the subsequent period.
For example, holding an additional directorship is associated with a roughly 9% increase
in the odds of a directorship appointment in the next quarter. A director with a single
directorship has only a 5% probability of adding at least one additional directorship in the
next quarter, while a director with twenty directorships has a 50% probability of joining
additional boards. This result is consistent with the idea that the size of a director’s portfolio
of directorships is a proxy for the quality of a director’s reputation.
However, directors have a finite amount of time to devote to each fund, and taking
on too many directorships may limit the director’s monitoring capacity. Survey evidence
(Carne Global Financial Services, 2011) suggests that fund managers and investors have such
concerns.The majority of respondents replied that the optimal director should have no more
than 20-30 directorships. Interestingly, few (<5%) respondents replied that directors should
have less than twenty directorships, while a similar proportion replied that more than fifty
is optimal. Thus, while reputation-based arguments suggest a director’s quality should be
increasing in the number of directorships he holds, this relation should weaken as directors
become increasingly busy.
In Model 2, we test for a non-linearity in the relation between the number of current
directorships and the likelihood that a director acquires a new directorship using a piecewise
linear specification estimated over three regions of current directorships (1-3, 4-20, and 21+).
We find that the relation between future appointments and current directorships is strongest
in the lower regions (1-3 and 4-20), and the relation significantly weakens in the upper region
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(a comparison of all three coefficients shows the differences are significant with a p-value <
0.001). That is, an increase in directorships (i.e., increase in reputational capital) matters
most for directors that do not hold many directorships to begin with. Directors that already
have more established reputations (sit on more than twenty boards) realize little additional
reputational benefits by serving on additional boards. This implies the net reputational
benefit of director busyness exhibits diminishing returns. It could be that extremely busy
directors have more reputational capital than less busy directors, but the additional capacity
costs of extra directorships may offset some of the reputational benefits.
In Model 3, we use the number of advisers the director works for (as a director) as a
proxy for director quality instead of the number of directorships. This proxy is potentially
more powerful than the raw number of directorships because, in addition to being more
reputable, directors that work for more advisers are also likely to be more independent. We
find a strong positive and significant relation between number of advisers and appointment
probability. Specifically, working for an additional adviser increases the the odds of a
directorship appointment by over 18%.
In Model 4, we explore the relation between the past performance of the funds in the
director’s portfolio and appointment probability. We continue to control for number of
advisers and also include the variable Director Return, which is the director’s equal-weight
“portfolio” return over the past three years across all funds for which the director serves (we
find similar results using alternative estimation windows). We also include Past Failures,
which is the number of failed funds (defined as exit from the commercial databases) on which
the director served, scaled by the maximum number of funds the director has previously
served on. We find a significant and positive (negative) relation between Director Return
(Past Failures) and directorship appointment probability.
Finally, we examine the importance of directorship firms. As argued above, if directorship
firms convey reputational benefits through a collective reputation channel, then we should
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see an incremental benefit for affiliating with directorship firms. In Model 5, we include
Directorship Firm, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the director works for a
directorship firm, and zero otherwise. We find that firm-affiliated directors are more than
three times as likely to gain an additional directorship as are unaffiliated directors. Including
Directorship Firm does not reduce the significance or substantially alter the magnitude of the
number of advisers variable, suggesting that the director is still more likely to be hired the
more popular he is, regardless of whether or not he works for a firm. Further, we add a proxy
for the reputational capital of the firm, Directorship Firm’s # of Funds, which is the number
of funds serviced by the firm. This variable is also positive and significant, indicating that
directors are more likely to be hired if they come from firms with more clients. For example, a
director from one of the ten largest directorship firms (in terms of the number of fund clients)
is 79.3% more likely to obtain a new directorship than a director from a less reputable firm.
These results support the hypothesis that directorship firms convey reputational benefits
through a collective reputation channel.
3.2.1. Robustness
In Table 4, we assess the robustness of our results to changes in sample construction and
control variables inclusion. One concern is that the population of director residents could be
driving the results. For instance, the majority of funds are domiciled in the Cayman Islands.
If it were the case Cayman funds only hired Cayman directors, then our results may be
driven by domicile population effects. To address this, in Panel A we present director-level
appointment regressions for each director country of residence subsample. We find a similar
significant and positive relation between number of advisers and appointment probability
across each country subsample, including the United States, where no offshore hedge funds
are domiciled. Thus, our results are not being driven by domicile population effects.
Another concern is that our measure of reputational capital is a proxy for other observable
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factors related to director quality. For example, it could be that directors obtain more
directorships due to having advanced degrees or certain industry experience, leading to a
spurious relation between busyness and appointment probability. To address this, we use
the subset of directors with hand collected biographical data from LinkedIn. Specifically,
we include the director’s age and gender, as well as indicators for whether the director: has
a graduate degree, graduated from a top 100 university, has a CFA, was a CEO, or has
experience in either private equity, law, fund management, or accounting. We present the
results in Panel B of Table 4.
In Model 1, we run our director appointment regressions including each biographical
variable and no reputational capital proxy. Of the ten biographical variables, only Age
and Fund Experience are significant. Specifically, younger directors and directors with fund
experience are significantly more likely to be appointed than older directors or directors
without fund experience. This regression has fairly low predictive power, with a pseudo R2
of about 0.03. In Model 2, we add our measure of director busyness (number of advisers)
and continue to find a positive and significant relation between number of advisers and
appointment probability after controlling for ten other observable director attributes. The
addition of this variable greatly increases the predictive power of the regression, as the pseudo
R2 increases to 0.19. Thus, it does not appear that director busyness is merely a proxy for
other observable director quality metrics. That said, our results are consistent with director
busyness being a proxy for the underlying quality of the director, which may be related to
other characteristics that are unobservable to the empiricist (such as intelligence, creativity,
business contacts, etc.). The logic behind using director busyness as a proxy for director
quality is that the directorship market should reveal the quality of directors, even if other
observable characteristics do not.
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4. Director and Fund Matching
In the previous section, we implicitly characterized the directorship market as one-sided
with funds choosing directors and director human capital being regarded equally across all
funds. However, the market is actually characterized by two-sided matching, with funds
appointing directors and directors agreeing to work for funds. For instance, a fund may
prefer hiring one director over another because his skills and experience make him a better
fit for that fund’s specific needs (Denis, Denis, and Walker, 2015). Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and
Masulis (2013) show that proximity to larger pools of local director talent leads to more
independent boards in a sample of US industrial firms. In addition, higher quality funds may
have an advantage in attracting higher quality directors if directors are capacity constrained
and/or concerned that working for lower quality funds could harm their reputation. In this
section, we examine how director hiring decisions are influenced by the interaction between
the characteristics of funds and directors.
4.1. Hypothesis Development
We expect that funds will seek to hire directors with more fund-specific human capital,
i.e. those with attributes or experience that complement the specific operating landscape
of the fund. Moreover, such directors bear a relatively lower marginal cost in accepting the
position, allowing them to serve on more funds. Thus directors should also prefer to work for
funds that match their human capital. with more fund-specific human capital should We
examine fund-specific human capital along four dimensions.
First, we predict that directors are more likely to be hired if they have experience working
with the fund’s adviser in the past. A director with adviser-specific knowledge may be able
to invest less monitoring effort in order to understand the idiosyncratic characteristics of
the fund, since many of those characteristics are likely shared by the adviser’s other funds.
This should reduce the director’s costs and improve his efficacy as a monitor. Further, the
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director’s quality is less uncertain from the adviser’s perspective, which should reduce the
risk of adding him to the fund’s board.
Second, we predict that directors are more likely to be hired if they have experience
working with the fund’s administrator or other key service providers. In order to monitor
the fund’s actions, the director must frequently engage with and monitor the fund’s service
providers. For instance, fund administrators generate comprehensive reports about fund
trading and valuation practices, and the director must read and interpret the administrator’s
findings to understand whether the fund is operating in the interests of its investors. A
director who has worked with the administrator in the past can understand their reports
within the context of the other reports he has received, improving his ability to make an
informed evaluation of the administrator’s findings. Further, a director who has a relationship
with a service provider may be able to extract critical soft information about fund actions,
improving his ability to monitor.
Third, we predict that directors are more likely to be hired if they have more experience
with funds that operate similar investment strategies. Many hedge funds concentrate their
operations in highly specialized trading strategies. The valuation and reporting issues that
are relevant to merger arbitrage funds may differ from the issues relevant to funds trading
illiquid debt instruments. Dass, Kini, Nanda, Onal, and Wang (2014) argue that directors
with related industry experience can better process firm-specific information, improving their
monitoring ability. Similarly, a director whose past experience is more closely aligned with
the fund’s investment strategy should be in a better position to evaluate the fund’s actions.
Fourth, we predict that directors that reside in the same domicile are more likely to be
hired by the fund. Although directors need not hail from the same domicile as the fund
(indeed, the most common residency is the United States, which has no offshore funds), those
that do have a distinct advantage in that they can attend meetings at a significantly lower
cost.
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Hypothesis 2a Directors and funds are more likely to match if the director is local and if
the director has more experience with the fund’s adviser, fund’s service providers, and funds
that operate similar investment strategies to the hiring fund.
In addition to matching based on monitoring cost minimization, directors and funds may
also match based on their quality. While a fund may desire to hire a highly reputable director,
that director could choose not to work for that particular fund if it would not help their career
or if they have a better outside option. Similarly, while a director may desire to serve on the
board of a well-run hedge fund, that fund might not be willing to hire that director. Higher
quality funds should have an advantage in attracting higher quality directors if directors
are capacity constrained and/or concerned that working for lower quality funds could harm
their reputation. If directors seek jobs at high quality funds and funds seek to hire high
quality directors, then the hedge fund directorship market would result in positive assortative
matching, similar to the market for marriages (Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos,
2014), or the market matching underwriters to firms issuing public equity (Fernando, Gatchev,
and Spindt, 2005).
Hypothesis 2b We expect busier directors to match with higher quality funds in the labor
market.
4.2. Results
We test these hypotheses in Table 5 with a director selection model that uses a conditional
logit regression to estimate the probability a fund hires a specific director as a function of
the interaction between fund and director characteristics. This approach is similar to the
one employed in Kuhnen (2009) to estimate the likelihood a mutual fund adviser hires a
specific sub-adviser from the set of all sub-adviser candidates. The unit of observation is the
fund-director pair (directorship). For each director that is hired by a fund during our sample
(2,616 unique hires), we select 100 random control directors from the universe of outside
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directors that served on any board in that period, but were not hired by the fund. The fixed
effects in the conditional logit regression are at the fund-date level, which controls for fund
and time characteristics involved in the hiring decision. Thus, the effects estimated in this
approach are at the director and director-fund pair level. In each model, we include a measure
of fund-specific human capital and control for the general reputational capital of the director
using the number of advisers or number of funds the director work for. Previous Adviser
Relationships is a count of the number of instances the director previously worked with the
fund’s adviser. Experience with Administrator (Experience with Other Service Providers) is
an indicator variable equal to one if the director has experience with the fund’s administrator
(custodian, auditing firm, law firm, or prime broker), and zero otherwise. Director Portfolio
Correlation is defined as the correlation of the fund’s returns with the returns of the other
fund’s in the director’s portfolio. The logic behind this variable is that funds operating similar
strategies should have more correlated returns (Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012). Correlations
are estimated on a rolling basis over the previous 36 months for both the treatment and
control directors. Local Director is an indicator equal to one if the director resides in the
same country as the fund’s domicile.
In Model 1, we find a significant and positive relation between the human capital variables
and the probability the director is hired by a fund. A director is 5.2 times more likely to
be hired by a fund if they have previously worked for another one of the adviser’s funds.
Directors that have experience with the fund’s administrator (other service providers), are
2.3 (1.2) times more likely to be hired, and a one standard deviation increase in Director
Portfolio Correlation increases the chances the director is hired by 3.1 times. Finally, we
see that a fund is 4.3 times more likely to hire a local director. Taken together, the results
indicate that fund-specific human capital plays an important role in the labor market for
hedge fund directors, suggesting that directors and funds match in such a way as to reduce
the time constraints associated with performing the director’s duties.
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To test our assortative matching hypothesis, we add interactions of fund characteristics
with our measures of the reputational capital of the director (i.e., # of Advisers or # of Funds
the director works for). Fund Return is the fund’s trailing three year return. Fund Regulatory
Violation equals one is the fund’s adviser reports a regulatory action on its Form ADV. Note,
because the fund is common to both the actual director and the 100 random control directors
for each hiring event, the base effect of the fund characteristic has already been controlled
for by the model’s fixed effects. In Model 2, we find that # of Advisers × Fund Return is
positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level). Thus, funds with higher past returns
are more likely to hire directors who work for a larger number of advisers. In Model 3, we
find that # of Advisers × Fund Regulatory Violation is negative and significant. Funds with
managers that have no history of regulatory violations hire directors who work for a greater
number of advisers. We find similar results in Models 4 through 6 when we use # of Funds
instead of # of Advisers. Collectively, these results suggest that higher quality funds are able
to hire directors with better reputations, consistent with positive assortative matching.
5. Evidence of Certification: Director Exits and Fund Flows
Positive assortative matching is consistent with the idea that reputable independent
directors act as a certification mechanism for high quality funds. If so, what happens when
the director removes his certification from the fund? Once on the board, a director has an
incentive to monitor the fund and influence management to behave appropriately. However,
if he is unable to influence the fund against engaging in conduct that could tarnish his
reputation, he has an incentive to leave the board. Given this incentive, the departure of
an independent director from the board could be viewed as a loss of certification and cause
investors to negatively update their opinion of fund quality (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz,
2013). If the departure of an independent director is tantamount to a loss of certification,
then we would expect to see their departures accompanied by outflows of investor capital.
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To test this prediction, in Table 6, we model the relation between independent director
exits and fund flows in a regression framework. Again, we define a director to be Independent
if he sits on the boards of funds managed by multiple advisers and the director is not conflicted
by providing other services to the fund such as legal or audit work. The unit of observation
is a fund-quarter. The dependent variable is the fund’s quarterly, implied net flow. In each
model, we control for observable fund characteristics that have been shown to affect flows,
including lagged values of fund size, age, fees, share illiquidity, flows, performance, and
volatility. We also include style, time, and jurisdiction fixed effects to control for unobservable
heterogeneity that may explain fund flows.11 We cluster our standard errors at the fund level.
In Model 1 of Table 6, we find that when a fund loses and is unable to replace at least one
independent director, on average the fund loses 4.7% of its capital. This effect is statistically
significant and economically meaningful, given that the average quarterly flow in our sample
is -0.28%. To control for any backfill bias, we remove the first 18 months of each fund’s
return history in Model 2 and our results are unchanged. In Model 3, we restrict the sample
to those funds with more liquid redemption restrictions (notice periods of one quarter or less)
so as to more clearly identify cases where investors could react to director departures in a
timely manner. In these cases independent director exits are associated with a 6.8% outflow.
12 Another concern with our analysis is that directors and investors may be simultaneously
leaving funds because of poor current performance. To address this issue, in Model 4 we drop
funds in the bottom style-adjusted performance quintile for the current quarter. Our results
are similar.
As we do not observe the cause of director turnover, some director exits are likely benign
11Past research has shown that fund flows and flow-performance relationship can vary across fund domicile
(Cumming, Dai, and Johan, 2015a). In addition to including jurisdiction fixed effects, when we include
interactions between jurisdiction dummies and past performance (untabulated), the results are unchanged.
12We also consider the possibility that a change in service provider, such as administrator or auditor, could
confound the analysis. In unreported tests, we re-run Model 1 and exclude observations with any concurrent
change in service providers. We find the results are qualitatively similar.
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(e.g. director retirement). In these cases, certification may not be lost if a fund can replace a
lost independent director with another reputable director. In Model 5, Independent Exit w/
Replacement equals one if the fund replaces an independent director with another independent
director, and zero otherwise. The coefficients on Independent Exit w/o Replacement and
Independent Exit w/ Replacement are not additive, as we separately estimate the effect of
director departure on flows based on whether the director is replaced. We find that flows
are statistically insignificant surrounding independent director replacements.13 This suggests
that the loss of an independent director sends a stronger negative signal if the fund does not
(or cannot) replace the director.
If the value of a director’s certification hinges on his reputation, then we would expect the
magnitude of the investors’ reaction to be positively related to the magnitude of the exiting
director’s reputational capital. In Model 6, we include exits of non-independent directors,
i.e., directors that only work for the one adviser. Examining the loss of non-independent
directors serves as a placebo test of whether investor withdrawals are associated with director
departures in general, or whether investors distinguish the information content of departures
based on the reputation of the director. The flow response to the loss of a non-independent
director is approximately zero. In Model 7, we examine the magnitude of reputational capital
lost by measuring the number of external adviser board seats held by the exiting independent
director, EXIT × # External Advisers. We find that even within the sample of independent
director exits, investors react more negatively to the exits of independent directors that serve
more external advisers. We find similar results in Model 8 when we proxy for reputational
capital using the number of different external fund’s a director works for.
Collectively, these results support the notion that a director’s outside reputation is an
important component of his ability to certify fund quality, as the market reacts more negatively
13In unreported tests, we separately examine whether the independent director was replaced from within the
same directorship firm or with a director from another directorship firm. The results are similar.
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to the loss of certification from more reputable directors. An alternative explanation of
our findings is that independent director exits are not a signal that investors use to update
their priors about fund quality, but rather that the exit of independent directors may
be related to some unobservable negative shock to the fund that directors and investors
observe simultaneously, causing them both to leave the fund. However, this explanation does
not contradict our main contention, which is that busier directors have more pronounced
reputational incentives to exit the board when they perceive trouble at the fund, bolstering
their ability to serve as a certification mechanism.
6. Evidence of Monitoring: Fraud, Discretionary Liquidity Restrictions, and
Risk Shifting
6.1. Fund Fraud
Because they face limited oversight and disclosure rules, hedge funds are particularly
susceptible to operational risks (Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz, 2008). Perhaps
the most important role of directors is to monitor fund activities so as to ensure the fund
is complying with the law and is not engaging in misconduct that could harm investors.
Directors must approve many actions taken by the fund where there is opportunity to engage
in misconduct, such as the valuation of illiquid assets, in-house trades with the investment
adviser, and the certification of the accuracy of fund information. If independent directors
play a governance role in hedge funds by providing external monitoring, we should expect to
see a lower prevalence of fraud for funds with more reputable independent directors on their
board. We test this proposition using administrative proceedings related to hedge fund fraud
filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
To obtain hedge fund fraud data, we follow an approach similar to Dimmock and Gerken
(2012) and search all SEC administrative proceedings that contain the terms “fraud” and
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“hedge fund” filed from January 2009 through November 2015.14 This process yields 181
filings. We read each filing and find 92 cases where a fund from our sample was involved
in fraud. We combine related cases into a single event. For example, in one case the fund
manager disproportionately allocated favorable trades to six client accounts (including ones
in which the manager had a personal stake), earned additional fees based on the boost in its
performance as a result, and misallocated fund assets to pay for part of a divorce settlement
and for a personal timeshare in New York.
Because we care about when the fraud occurred (rather than when it was detected), we
use the detail from the administrative proceedings to determine the time period when the
SEC reports the fraud to have actually taken place. In doing so, we avoid potential bias
caused by a correlation between detection and time variation in the predictive variables of
interest.15 We then create an indicator variable Fraud, which is equal to one if the fund was
engaged in a fraud in a particular quarter and zero otherwise. In our sample, a fraud is
ongoing in 1.2% of fund-quarters.16
Table 7 reports results from a logit regression predicting Fraud in period t + 1 as a
function of board variables and other fund characteristics observed in period t. The unit of
observation is a fund-quarter, and we use the full sample of funds with non-missing data.
The number of observations in Table 7 is much larger than in our previous tables because we
do not require any variables from the commercial databases.17 In each model our variable of
14We look for detected case of fraud through the end of November 2015 as fraud may occur for several years
before it is detected and reported in the SEC administrative proceedings.
15A related concern shared with many archival studies of misconduct is that we only observe detected events.
Fund characteristics that decreases the probability of detection increases the incentive for fraud. In general,
this relation biases against finding significant results in a predictive model, as characteristics associated
with a higher rate of fraud will also be associated with a lower detection rate.
16The observed rate of fraud is similar to other studies of investment managers (e.g. Dimmock and Gerken,
2012) as well as other types of corporate fraud (e.g. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008).
17As we report below, funds that voluntarily report to commercial databases are much less likely to commit
fraud, creating a potential selection bias. In an untabulated result, we also estimate the model using only
the funds that report to a commercial database and find qualitatively similar and significant results for our
measures of board independence.
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interest is a measure of board reputation/independence. In addition, we control for three
measures related to board diversity: board age, whether the board has a female director,
and the overlap in past positions held by the directors, as past studies find that increased
diversity can reduce the incidence of fraud (e.g., see Cumming, Leung, and Rui (2015b)).
We also control for fund size, adviser size, minimum investment, institutional clientele, and
whether the fund reports to commercial hedge fund databases. Standard errors are clustered
at the fund-level.
In Model 1, our measure of board reputation/independence is the indicator variable Has
Independent, which equals one if there is at least one independent director on the board, and
zero otherwise. The coefficient on Has Independent is negative and significant at the less
than 1% level. The result implies that funds with independent directors are 84% less likely
to engage in fraud. In Models 2 and 3 we measure board reputation/independence as the
normalized sum of board engagements held by the outside directors of the fund that are
external to the fund’s adviser. We use the number of external advisers, # External Advisers,
in Model 2 and the number of external funds, # External Funds, in Model 3. Consistent with
Model 1, both these models provide evidence that greater board reputation/independence
is related to a much lower likely of future fraudulent behavior. We note that we also find
evidence that more diverse boards are less likely to commit fraud, consistent with past
literature. Specifically, we find that funds with a female director are significantly less likely
to engage in fraud and funds whose directors have worked with each other on more past
engagements (and thus are potentially more prone to groupthink) are more likely to commit
fraud.
In unreported analysis on those funds for which we have detailed service provider data,
we also control for other governance metrics that were shown in Brown et al. (2012) to be
related to hedge fund operational risk: whether the fund had a Big 4 auditor, valued its
assets internally, and switched its administrator. Our key results still hold. Further, we also
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run our analyses including individual service provider fixed effects and find similar results,
indicating the effect of board independence on fraud cannot simply be explained solely by
cross-sectional differences in the quality of other fund service providers.
As detected fraud is jointly determined by the true fraud rate and detection rate, we need
to exercise care in attributing differences in the observed fraud rates. We address this in
two ways. First, we identify when fraud occurred and the dependent variable is measured
during the occurrence of fraud in a given year, even if the fraud is not detected until years
later. Second, we examine the duration of the fraud as a proxy for detection rate. The
average duration of the fraud is 14 quarters for funds with independent directors, and 17
quarters for those without. The shorter fraud duration for funds with independent boards is
inconsistent with the idea that these funds have a lower fraud detection rate. To confirm
the predictive validity of our models, we also perform K-fold cross-validation tests and find
consistent predictive power from our measures of board independence.18 In sum, the presence
of reputable, independent directors is strongly related to lower fraud risk.
6.2. Discretionary Liquidity Restrictions
During the recent financial crisis, many hedge fund managers used their discretion to
restrict investor liquidity through the use of gates or side pockets.19 The use of these
discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) by fund managers is controversial because, while
DLRs can protect investors by helping funds avoid costly fire sales, DLRs could be abused
by managers who restrict withdrawals in order to preserve fund capital in the face of poor
expected performance. Because the board has to approve the manager’s decision to establish
a DLR, they provide an interesting laboratory to test the monitoring efficacy of independent
hedge fund directors. Specifically, we test whether there is an association between a fund’s
18See Dimmock and Gerken (2012) for a discussion of the technique in this setting.
19See Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2015) for details of these discretionary liquidity restrictions.
29
post-DLR performance and its board structure. If independent directors are better monitors
they should be able to mitigate DLR abuses, meaning that the post-DLR performance should
be higher for funds with independent boards than for funds with non-independent boards.
We begin with the sample of DLR funds used in Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis (2015), and
collect Form D filings for each fund in order to obtain its board structure. The majority
of DLRs were initiated between 2007-2009 which was before funds filed their Form D in
electronic format. Prior to electronic filing, Form D’s were kept on the SEC website in the
format of scanned paper copies (sometimes containing hand-written responses), requiring
manual encoding of each fund filing. Because of the cost of obtaining this data, we only
obtain board structures for the DLR sample of funds, which means we cannot ascertain
the number of other directorships held by the director. However, we can ascertain whether
the director is an outsider or an insider, and we use this classification as a proxy for board
independence.20 Our sample includes 230 DLR funds, 52 of which have an independent
director on their board. The presence of independent directors in the DLR sample (22.6%)
is far lower than the full-sample average we use in our main analysis (79.2%), suggesting
that funds with independent directors were less likely to establish DLRs than funds with
inside-only boards.21
In Figure 1 we present the compound quarterly performance of DLR funds stratified by
board structure along with the performance of the hedge fund index in event time surrounding
the DLR initiation quarter. We see that both funds with and without independent directors
significantly underperform the hedge fund index in the quarters leading up to the DLR,
suggesting that both types of funds enact DLRs in response to poor performance. Remember
that the efficient rationale for imposing DLRs is to avoid being forced to sell temporarily
20When we examine the sample of data where we can obtain the directors’ other employment data, this proxy
procedure correctly classifies independent boards 88% of the time.
21We note, however, that the differences in data collection procedures and sample timing between the DLR
and full sample could affect these inferences.
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undervalued assets at fire-sale prices. Thus, enacting DLRs in response to poor performance
is not evidence of managerial malfeasance. However, the efficient rationale also predicts that
the fund should realize a rebound in performance subsequent to enacting the DLR, as its
undervalued assets return to fair value as markets stabilize.
When we examine the two years following the DLR, it is clear that funds with inside-only
boards do not experience a rebound in performance, as their cumulative performance is
essentially flat over that period. In contrast, funds with independent directors experience
a pronounced rebound in performance and eclipse their pre-DLR asset values by the end
of the fourth quarter. Moreover, the independent board sample significantly outperforms
the inside-only sample by 2.02% per quarter (t-stat=3.73) over the two years following the
DLR. This pattern is striking, as it suggests that the performance pattern of funds with an
independent board more closely resembles how it should look if the funds enacted DLRs to
protect investor interests. This evidence suggests independent directors play an important
role in hedge fund governance by monitoring the manager’s discretionary choices in order to
mitigate conflicts of interest with investors.
6.3. Risk Shifting
Another potential agency problem is performance-based risk-shifting, which is the idea
that when funds face convex incentives based on their calendar year-end performance, those
with poor performance in the first half of the year may have an incentive to increase risk in
the second half of the year in order to “catch-up” to their peers or to meet certain pre-defined
performance thresholds. This type of strategic risk-shifting has been documented for both
mutual funds (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996), and hedge funds (Aragon and Nanda,
2012), and there is evidence that risk-shifting directly harms investor interests (Huang, Sialm,
and Zhang, 2011). In our sample, more than 90% of hedge funds have a performance-based
incentive fee that is subject to a highwater mark provision (HWM), meaning the fund only
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earns an incentive fee if its performance is high enough to eclipse the fund’s HWM by the
end of the calendar year. This asymmetric compensation structure directly creates convex
incentives that could induce poor performers at mid-year to increase risk in the second half
of the year in order to increase the probability they earn a performance fee. In this section,
we test whether funds with more reputable, independent directors are less likely to engage in
this type of risk shifting.
Our methodological setup is similar to Aragon and Nanda (2012). We form an annual
panel of hedge funds and regress changes in hedge fund risk on mid-year fund performance,
measures of board independence/reputation, and other fund controls. The dependent variable,
∆Risk, is the difference in the standard deviations of the fund’s monthly returns between
the first half and second half of the calendar year. BOARD refers to one of our three board
reputation proxies: Has Independent, # External Board Seats, and # External Advisers.
We follow Aragon and Nanda (2012) and measure mid-year performance (PerfJune) as the
fractional rank (within style) of the fund’s percentage distance to its HWM as of the end
of June. We use the within-style ranking of this measure to account for the fact that funds
may also care about their performance relative to their peers, though we find similar results
with the unadjusted measure. We also include several control variables, including controls for
lagged risk and changes in fund autocorrelation to control for mean reversion, as well as fund
size, flows, age, minimum investment, share restrictions, leverage, and fees. In each model,
the variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction BOARD × PerfJune, as this tests
whether the presence of independent/reputable directors helps to curtail a fund’s propensity
to increase risk following poor performance.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 8. The coefficient on BOARD is
negative in each model, meaning that funds with reputable independent directors engage in
less risk shifting unconditional on performance. Consistent with the risk-shifting literature,
the coefficient on PerfJune is negative in each model, meaning that funds tend to increase
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risk in the second half of the year following poor performance in the first half of the year.
Overall, we find some evidence that funds with more reputable independent directors
on the board engage in less performance-based risk shifting. Specifically, the coefficient on
the interaction BOARD × PerfJune is positive and significant at the 1% level for the board
measures # External Board Seats and # External Advisers. The coefficient estimates indicate
that a one standard deviation in # External Board Seats or # External Advisers reduces
risk shifting by roughly 37%. Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction is insignificant
when we use the Has Independent measure, suggesting that it is the independent directors
with greater reputational capital that are able to curtail performance-based risk shifting.
Collectively, we view this as additional evidence that suggests reputable independent directors
are able to constrain hedge fund agency problems.
7. Discussion of Alternative Hypothesis
Thus far, we have interpreted our results as suggesting that director labor market incentives
create a virtuous cycle of job accumulation and director incentive alignment: good directors
are rewarded in the director labor market with more jobs, which increases their reputational
capital and independence from management, which increases their incentives and ability to
be good monitors, making them even more attractive in the director labor market. Absent
exogenous variation in director certification, however, we acknowledge that it is difficult to
rule out all possible alternative hypotheses.22
One plausible alternative explanation for our results is that directors become busy by
agreeing to serve as cronies of management, and their noted willingness to sign off on
management’s wishes makes them more attractive in the labor market. We take seriously
this “rubber-stamp” hypothesis and, for reasons we discuss below, find it to be inconsistent
22For example, director deaths are far too infrequent in our sample for any meaningful empirical analysis,
and no significant regulatory changes regarding directors were implemented.
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with the entirety of our evidence.
First, we note that given the lack of regulation as to a board’s composition, a less costly
solution for the fund would be to appoint two internal candidates to the board to rubber-stamp
the manager’s decisions. Thus, this rubber-stamping equilibrium assumes that investors
demand external directors serve on the board, but are naive about their role.
Second, the relation between director busyness and the likelihood of being hired by a fund
is concave and flattens when directors are very busy, consistent with directors running into
capacity cost issues when handling a heavy workload. Rubber-stamps should have an ever
increasing, maybe even convex relation, as busy rubber stamps would be in high demand and
would not face capacity costs when holding a token board seat.
Third, busier directors are more likely to match with better performing funds, consistent
with positive assortative matching on fund and director quality. Rubber-stamps should be
more equally sought after by poor quality funds, and one might expect that rubber-stamps
would be more likely to work for poor performing funds that have not been properly monitored
by the board.23
Fourth, busy directors are associated with a lower incidence of fund fraud and investors
withdraw more money from the fund when busier directors exit. It is unlikely that the
departure of a rubber-stamp director should signal that anything is wrong with the fund given
that the management can always replace the departing director with an equally amenable
inside director.
Finally, in untabulated analysis we repeat our tests and proxy for director reputation
with External Director Return, which measures the average performance of the other funds
the director works for (external to the “treated” adviser of the reference fund) over the past
23In untabulated analysis, we find the relation between future performance and board busyness is positive,
though not significant. This contrasts with the view that busy directors would be harmful for firm
performance.
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36 months. This measure is not mechanically related to the number of funds the director
works for, yet we find statistically significant results that are consistent with our busyness
measures, which helps corroborate the assertion that busyness is a proxy for a high-quality
reputation rather than a crony reputation.
8. Conclusion
Following the recent wave of scandals and failures in the hedge fund industry, considerable
debate has emerged as to how hedge funds should be governed. Despite receiving considerable
scrutiny by practitioners and the media, the hedge fund’s board of directors has garnered
scant attention in the academic literature. This paper serves as a first step toward filling this
gap. Hedge fund directors have fiduciary duties to protect investor interests by monitoring
hedge fund managers, yet they are hired by the very managers they are meant to monitor.
Thus, hedge directors could be co-opted by fund management in a way that is much stronger
than the way in which a corporate director might be co-opted by the CEO. Corporate
directors may be co-opted because the CEO has informal bargaining power with the board
and influence over director selection decisions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). However,
common stockholders still have ultimate control over board composition through their voting
power. In contrast, hedge fund investors cannot vote for their preferred directors and are
left to vote with their feet. Our collective findings suggest that several unique institutional
features have emerged in the market for hedge fund directors which serve to ameliorate this
inherent conflict.
Most hedge funds voluntarily elect outside directors to their board, and the majority of
these outside directorships are held by a select group of professionals that serve on dozens of
boards at once. Many of these professional directors are members of directorships firms which
appear to be organized similarly to large law or accounting firms. Our results cast considerable
doubt on the claim that these institutional features are symptoms of the irrelevancy of hedge
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fund boards. Rather, we contend that these features emerged to make boards relevant, and
can in part be explained by the market forces of reputational bonding and certification.
Funds desire outside certification to attract investors, and professional directors put their own
and their firm’s reputational capital on the line to make that certification credible. Though
the director may be very busy, the upshot is that investors know his prosperity does not
depend on pleasing any particular manager that hired him. Many (e.g., Romano, 2005) have
raised significant concerns about establishing true director independence, given that many
“independent” directors have a personal interest in retaining their friendly relationship with
management. We posit that by serving many masters at once, busy directors may be able to
more closely represent investor interests in the true spirit of independence.
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Table A.1
Variable Definitions
The following table defines each of the variables in the paper and provides its source. Our data come from five unique databases:
Form D (SEC), Form ADV (SEC), the union of the five largest commercial hedge fund databases (LipperTass, HFR, BarclayHedge,
Eureka Hedge, and Morningstar), FundGov, and LinkedIn.
Variable Definition Source
# Directors Count variable for the number of directors on the board Form D
# Insider Count variable for the number of inside (i.e. employed by
hedge fund’s investment adviser) directors on the board
Form D
# of Advisers Number of unique advisers among fund boards on which the
the director currently serves
Form D
# of External Advisers Number of unique advisers among fund boards on which the
the director currently serves, external to the affiliated adviser
Form D
# of External Funds Number of unique fund boards on which the the director
currently serves, external to the affiliated adviser
Form D
# of Funds Number of unique fund boards on which the the director
currently serves
Form D
# Outsider Count variable for the number of outside (i.e. not employed
by hedge fund’s investment adviser) directors on the board
Form D
Director Portfolio Correlation 36-month correlation of the fund’s returns with the returns
of the external funds in the director’s portfolio
Commercial Databases
Director Return 36-month equal-weighted return of the portfolio of hedge
funds for which the director serves on the board
Commercial Databases
Directorship Firm Indicator variable equal to one if the director is employed by
a professional directorship firm, and zero otherwise
Form D
Directorship Firm’s # of Funds Count variable based on the number of directorships held by
the directors in the directorship firm
Form D
Experience with Administrator Indicator variable equal to one if the director had previously
worked for a fund that uses the same administrator as the
hiring fund, and zero otherwise
Commercial Databases
Experience with Adviser Count variable of the number of times the director had
previously worked for a fund run by the hedge fund adviser
Form D
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Experience with Other Service
Providers
Indicator variable equal to one if the director had pre-
viously worked for a fund that uses the same law firm,
accounting firm, prime broker, or custodian as the hiring
fund, and zero otherwise
Commercial Databases
Flow Fund’s implied, quarterly net flow Commercial Databases
Fund Age Age of the fund based on the funds date of initial sale Form D
Fund Regulatory Violation Indicator variable equal to one if the fund’s adviser re-
ports a regulatory action, and zero otherwise
Form ADV
Fund Size Assets under management for the fund Form D
Incentive Fee Annual performance-based fee charged by the fund Commercial Databases
Independent Indicator variable equal to one if the fund has an in-
dependent director (i.e. an outside director employed
by multiple advisers that is not conflicted by providing
other services to the fund such as legal or audit work.)
Form D
Management Fee Annual management fee charged by the fund Commercial Databases
Minimum Investment Fund’s stated minimum investment to join the fund Form D
Past Failures Count variable of the number of funds the director sat
on a fund that failed
Commercial Databases
Performance Rank Rank of the fund’s return over the previous 12 months Commercial Databases
Reports to a Database Indicator variable equal to one if the fund reports to a
commercial database in quarter t, and zero otherwise
Commercial Databases
Share Liquidity Indicator equal to one if the fund’s share liquidity is
above median. We collapse share liquidity to one fac-
tor by taking the first principal component from the
fund’s lockup, redemption notice period, and redemption
frequency.
Commercial Databases
Standard Deviation Standard deviation of the fund’s monthly returns over
the previous 12 months
Commercial Databases
Teammate Indicator variable equal to one if the director simultane-
ously serves on a board with another director from the
same Directorship Firm, and zero otherwise
Form D
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Director Age Age of director in year t FundGov
Female Indicator variable equal to one if the director is female,
and zero otherwise
FundGov
Top 100 School Indicator variable equal to one if the director’s undergrad-
uate institution was ranked in the top 100 universities
by QS World University Rankings, and zero otherwise
LinkedIn
CFA Indicator variable equal to one if the director is a char-
tered financial analyst, and zero otherwise
LinkedIn
Grad School Indicator variable equal to one if the director has an
advanced degree, and zero otherwise
LinkedIn
Fund Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the director has profes-
sional work experience in the investment management
industry, and zero otherwise
FundGov
CEO Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the director has profes-
sional work experience as a CEO, and zero otherwise
FundGov
PE Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the director has pro-
fessional work experience in the private equity industry,
and zero otherwise
FundGov
Law Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the director has profes-
sional work experience as a lawyer, and zero otherwise
FundGov
Accounting Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the director has pro-
fessional work experience as an accountant, and zero
otherwise
FundGov
Local Director Indicator variable equal to one if the director’s country
of residence is the same as the domicile of the fund, and
zero otherwise
FundGov
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Fig. 1
Performance around Discretionary Liquidity Restriction Event
The figure presents the average cumulative returns for three separate portfolios, where quarter
0 is the DLR event quarter. Has Independence represents the returns from the set of funds
that have at least one independent director on the board. No Independence represents the
set of funds that have no independent directors on the board. Index represents returns from
an equal-weighted quarterly hedge fund index from the union of five commercial databases
(Lipper TASS, HFR, BarclayHedge, Morningstar, and Eurekahedge).
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Table 1
Hedge Fund Board Structure
We present summary statistics for hedge fund board structures during our sample period of 2009-
2013. The unit of observation is a hedge fund-quarter. In Panel A, we report the distribution of
board structures. # Directors is a count variable for the number of directors on the board. #
Insiders is a count variable for the number of inside directors on the board. # Outsiders is a count
variable for the number of outside directors on the board. Any Outsider is an indicator variable
equal to one if the board has at least one Outsider, and zero otherwise. In Panel B, we tabulate the
frequency of board structures by number of inside and outside directors. In Panel C, we report the
% of funds and the average number of directors/outside directors by the most common hedge fund
domiciles in our sample.
Panel A: Board Structure
Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th
# Directors 3.1 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 5.0
# Insider 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
# Outsider 1.8 0.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
Any Outsider 79.2% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Panel B: Distribution of Board Structures
Inside Directors
Outside Directors 0 1 2 3+ Total
0 0.0% 5.6% 8.1% 7.1% 20.8%
1 0.7% 4.4% 4.5% 1.7% 11.3%
2 14.7% 25.5% 2.6% 2.9% 45.6%
3+ 13.3% 3.9% 3.2% 1.9% 22.3%
Total 28.7% 39.4% 18.4% 13.5% 100.0%
Panel C: Hedge Fund Domicile
Domicile % of Funds Mean # Directors Mean # Outsiders
Cayman Islands 79.6% 2.9 1.7
British Virgin Islands (BVI) 7.8% 3.4 1.6
Bermuda 4.0% 3.6 2.0
Other 8.7% 4.7 2.9
45
Table 2
Director Summary Statistics
We present summary statistics for hedge fund directors during our sample period of 2009-2013.
In Panel A, we separately present statistics for the # of funds and the # of advisers the outside
director concurrently serves on at the director level and directorship level. At the Director Level,
the unit of observation is from the director’s perspective, namely an outside director-quarter. At
the Directorship Level, the unit of observation is constructed from the fund’s perspective, namely
an outside board seat-quarter. In Panel B, we stratify our sample based on the director’s workload
across funds and director independence. We define a director to be independent if they sit on
the boards of funds managed by multiple adviser and have no other business relationship with
the fund. We report the proportion of outside directors and outside board seats for each strata.
Further, we report whether a director was employed by a Directorship Firm and whether the director
simultaneously serves on the board with a director from the same firm, Teammate. In Panel C, we
repeat this approach to examine the distribution of service providers each strata of directors work
with. In Panel D, we report director residency. In Panel E, we report biographic data for a sample
of outside directors available from the data provider LinkedIn.
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Panel A: Director Residency
U.S. Cayman Islands U.K. Other Bermuda BVI
27.8% 16.0% 8.4% 6.7% 6.7% 1.5%
Panel B: Director Workload
Mean 25th Median 75th
Director Level # of Funds 6.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
# of Advisers 3.5 1.0 1.0 2.0
Directorship Level # of Funds 41.0 6.0 22.0 53.0
# of Advisers 22.7 2.0 10.0 26.0
Panel C: Director Characteristics - by Workload
% of Directors % of Board Seats
[1-3] Funds 67.6% 17.9%
[4-20] Funds 24.8% 30.7%
[21+] Funds 7.5% 51.4%
Panel D: Director Bio - LinkedIn
Experience
Fund Management Accounting Law CEO Private Equity
39.1% 8.5% 8.2% 3.5% 2.9%
Age Female Top 100 School CFA Grad School
46.1 6.6% 6.9% 2.1% 4.9%
Panel E: Directorship Firms - by Workload
Directorship Firm Teammate
[1-3] Funds 19.8% 7.0%
[4-20] Funds 53.9% 21.1%
[21+] Funds 81.1% 42.4%
47
Table 3
Director Level Hiring Determinants
We use a logit model to predict the probability that a hedge fund director is hired in the subsequent
quarter. The unit of observation is a director-quarter from the sample of outside hedge fund directors.
All independent variables are defined in Table A.1. We include time fixed effects and cluster our
standard errors at the director level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of Funds 1.089***
[13.36]
# of Advisers 1.181*** 1.179*** 1.135***
[10.53] [10.41] [9.55]
# of Funds – Low(1-3) 1.605***
[10.19]
# of Funds – Mid (4-20) 1.152***
[18.15]
# of Funds – High(21+) 1.019***
[4.77]
Director Return 1.087**
[2.56]
Past Failures 0.908**
[-2.42]
Directorship Firm 2.589***
[8.43]
# of Funds - Directorship Firm 1.002**
[2.36]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.188 0.232 0.181 0.183 0.212
Observations 15,766 15,766 15,766 15,766 15,766
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Table 4
Director Level Hiring Determinants - Robustness
We use a logit model to predict the probability that a hedge fund director is hired in the subsequent
quarter. The unit of observation is a director-quarter from the sample of outside hedge fund directors.
In Panel A, we repeat Model 3 of Table 3 but partition on the six most common countries for
director residency. In Panel B, we partition our data on the sample of directors that provide profiles
on LinkedIn. The coefficients are presented as odds ratios. All independent variables are defined in
Table A.1. We include time fixed effects and cluster our standard errors at the director level. ***,
**, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Subsample by Director Country of Residence
U.S. U.K. Ireland Cayman Is. Bermuda B.V.I.
# of Advisers 1.210*** 1.340*** 1.415*** 1.117*** 1.168*** 1.248***
[3.72] [11.34] [9.22] [7.18] [6.12] [6.97]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0765 0.194 0.0887 0.196 0.189 0.281
Observations 3,701 957 896 2,102 1,004 187
Panel B: LinkedIn Subsample
(1) (2)
Female 1.147 0.778
[0.54] [-0.95]
Age 0.719*** 0.816**
[-3.12] [-2.16]
Top 100 University 0.977 0.969
[-0.09] [-0.15]
CFA 1.352 1.006
[0.79] [0.02]
Graduate Degree 1.070 1.226
[0.19] [0.77]
CEO Experience 0.771 0.671
[-0.60] [-1.38]
PE Experience 1.083 1.556*
[0.26] [1.73]
Law Experience 1.020 1.235
[0.09] [1.18]
Fund Experience 1.555*** 1.476***
[2.83] [2.97]
Accounting Experience 1.306 1.174
[1.26] [0.94]
# of Advisers 1.160***
[8.46]
Time FE Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0292 0.190
Observations 6,167 6,167
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Table 5
Director Selection and Fund Specific Human Capital
We use conditional logit models to predict the probability that a hedge fund director is hired in the subsequent quarter. The
dependent variable is equal to one for the actual director that was hired and zero for the randomly drawn directors that form the
control group. To form the random control group, for each hiring decision, we randomly draw 100 (with replacement) directors
from the set of all outside directors that were available to be hired at that time. The conditional logit is grouped by hiring decision.
All independent variables are defined in Table A.1. Our standard errors are clustered at the director level. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience with Adviser 5.196*** 3.398*** 4.217*** 5.048*** 3.306*** 4.139***
[4.34] [3.58] [3.71] [4.28] [3.47] [3.70]
Experience with Administrator 2.267*** 2.047*** 2.470*** 2.411*** 2.160*** 2.616***
[5.93] [4.51] [5.74] [6.29] [4.77] [5.75]
Experience with Other Service Providers 1.205* 1.125 1.259* 1.342** 1.270* 1.408***
[1.73] [0.92] [1.89] [2.57] [1.79] [2.72]
Director Portfolio Correlation 3.074*** 4.417*** 3.054*** 3.042*** 4.403*** 3.033***
[8.71] [9.60] [6.93] [8.74] [9.63] [6.93]
Local Director 4.286*** 4.529*** 4.489*** 5.135*** 5.412*** 5.320***
[8.30] [7.89] [7.49] [10.06] [9.61] [9.13]
# of Advisers × Fund Return 1.044*
[1.73]
# of Advisers × Fund Regulatory Violation 0.884**
[-2.04]
# of Funds × Fund Return 1.020*
[1.84]
# of Funds × Fund Regulatory Violation 0.907***
[-2.62]
# of Advisers 1.135*** 1.116*** 1.133***
[6.14] [5.07] [5.06]
# of Funds 1.059*** 1.050*** 1.056***
[4.45] [3.81] [3.97]
Hiring Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.318 0.322 0.317 0.298 0.300 0.299
Observations 138,471 88,779 98,071 138,471 88,779 98,071
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Table 6
Fund Flows and Director Exits
We model the relationship between funds flows and the loss of an outside director. The unit of
observation is a hedge fund - quarter. The dependent variable is the funds’ quarterly, implied net
flow. Independent Exit w/o Replacement (EXIT) takes on a value of one if the fund loses, and is
unable to replace, at least one director that serves across multiple advisers, and zero otherwise.
In Model 2, we drop the first 18 months of the fund’s life to mitigate incubation bias. In Model
3, we only include funds with redemption notice periods of one quarter or less. In Model 4, we
exclude funds in the bottom quintile of style-adjusted returns in the current quarter. In Model
5, Independent Exit w/ Replacement, that takes on a value of one if the fund loses, but replaces
the exiting independent director, and zero otherwise. In Model 6, Non-Independent Exit takes on
a value of one if the fund loses a director that does not serve across multiple advisers, and zero
otherwise. In Models 7 and 8, respectively, we interact Exit with the number of external advisers
and the number of external funds the exiting director serves on in the prior quarter. Each of these
independent variables are lagged one quarter and defined in Table A.1. We include style, time,
and jurisdiction fixed effects. Our standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and *
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Indep. Exit w/o Replacement (EXIT) -0.047** -0.047** -0.068*** -0.045* -0.047** -0.047** -0.047** -0.047**
[-2.02] [-2.00] [-3.03] [-1.72] [-2.01] [-2.02] [-2.28] [-2.24]
Indep. Exit w/ Replacement 0.015
[0.82]
Non-Indep. Exit 0.000
[0.00]
EXIT × # External Advisers -0.006**
[-2.04]
EXIT × # External Board Seats -0.003*
[-1.91]
Flow 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***
[13.13] [13.23] [11.23] [11.46] [13.14] [13.14] [13.15] [13.15]
Performance 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
[17.66] [17.06] [15.62] [16.34] [17.66] [17.66] [17.65] [17.65]
Risk -0.005** -0.005* -0.004 -0.007** -0.005* -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
[-1.98] [-1.92] [-1.62] [-2.30] [-1.96] [-1.98] [-2.00] [-2.01]
Log Fund Size -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
[-5.85] [-5.30] [-5.10] [-5.51] [-5.86] [-5.84] [-5.92] [-5.91]
Log Fund Age -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
[-5.51] [-4.20] [-5.01] [-5.76] [-5.53] [-5.50] [-5.49] [-5.49]
Redemption Frequency -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[-0.99] [-0.64] [-0.82] [-0.27] [-0.98] [-0.99] [-0.99] [-0.99]
Lockup 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.25] [-0.33] [1.05] [-0.43] [0.25] [0.25] [0.22] [0.24]
Redemption Notice Period -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[-0.76] [-0.12] [-0.67] [-1.03] [-0.76] [-0.75] [-0.68] [-0.69]
Management Fee 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[1.25] [1.52] [0.94] [0.86] [1.25] [1.25] [1.25] [1.25]
Incentive Fee -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[-0.39] [-0.75] [0.51] [-0.60] [-0.39] [-0.39] [-0.44] [-0.43]
Independent 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.24] [0.34] [1.00] [0.45] [0.17] [0.24] [0.29] [0.29]
Sum External Seats -0.000 -0.000
[-0.09] [-0.10]
Sample All Drop First Liquid Share Drop Worst All All All All
18 Months Restrictions Performers
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.122 0.122 0.125 0.128 0.122 0.122 0.124 0.124
Observations 11,847 10,799 8,983 9,509 11,847 11,847 11,847 11,847
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Table 7
Independent Directors and Incidence of Fraud
We use a logit model to predict the probability that a hedge fund engages in fraudulent activity.
We obtain the dates that a hedge fund fraud occurs during the SEC’s administrative proceedings.
The unit of observation is a fund-quarter. All independent variables are defined in Table A.1. We
include time fixed effects and cluster our standard errors at the fund level. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Has Independent 0.172***
[-5.31]
# External Board Seats 0.101**
[-2.00]
# External Advisers 0.041**
[-2.10]
Female 0.090*** 0.297** 0.321**
[-3.80] [-2.15] [-2.04]
Board Age 1.003 0.994 0.978
[0.18] [-0.32] [-0.84]
# Directorship Firms 0.237** 0.247*** 0.293***
[-2.21] [-3.13] [-3.10]
Director Network Overlap 1.023*** 1.063*** 1.074***
[2.89] [2.58] [2.84]
Log Fund Size 1.187** 1.163** 1.153*
[2.15] [1.97] [1.79]
Log Minimum Investment 0.784*** 0.788*** 0.797***
[-11.28] [-11.67] [-12.68]
Reports to Database 0.424** 0.432** 0.392**
[-2.08] [-2.09] [-2.43]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction FE Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.548 0.549 0.560
Observations 37,829 37,829 37,829
53
Table 8
Independent Directors and Risk Shifting
We model the relationship between changes in risk, performance, and board independence/reputation.
The unit of observation is a hedge fund - year. The dependent variable, ∆Risk, is the difference in
the standard deviations of the fund’s monthly returns between the first half and second half of the
calendar year. BOARD refers to one of our three board reputation proxies: Has Independent, #
External Funds, and # External Advisers. PerfJune, refers to the fractional rank (within style) of
the fund’s percentage distance to its HWM as of the end of June. All other independent variables
are defined in Table A.1. The table reports standardized coefficients. Each model includes time
fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the fund level. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: ∆ Risk
(1) (2) (3)
BOARD Definition: Has Independent # External Board Seats # External Advisers
BOARD -0.130* -0.091** -0.072*
[-1.71] [-2.46] [-1.88]
PerfJune -0.296*** -0.263*** -0.264***
[-4.16] [-6.12] [-6.12]
BOARD * PerfJune 0.049 0.099*** 0.099***
[0.56] [2.61] [2.62]
RiskJan.−June -1.322*** -1.325*** -1.324***
[-18.16] [-18.30] [-18.29]
Log Fund Size -0.125*** -0.128*** -0.128***
[-2.87] [-2.96] [-2.95]
∆ AR(1) -0.287*** -0.296*** -0.295***
[-6.42] [-6.64] [-6.61]
FlowJuly−Dec. 0.271 0.278 0.273
[0.88] [0.90] [0.88]
Log Fund Age -0.075 -0.073 -0.075
[-1.34] [-1.32] [-1.35]
Log Minimum Investment -0.081* -0.070 -0.071
[-1.84] [-1.59] [-1.60]
Redemption Frequency 0.108** 0.104** 0.106**
[2.37] [2.35] [2.40]
Lockup 0.052 0.057 0.054
[1.17] [1.28] [1.22]
Redemption Notice Period -0.141*** -0.146*** -0.147***
[-3.47] [-3.61] [-3.62]
Leverage 0.045 0.044 0.046
[1.19] [1.17] [1.20]
Incentive Fee 0.065 0.077 0.074
[1.10] [1.28] [1.23]
Management Fee 0.027 0.022 0.023
[0.67] [0.56] [0.59]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.487 0.489 0.489
Observations 2,246 2,246 2,246
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Internet Appendix
IA.1. Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 (’33 Act) requires any offer to sell securities to U.S. investors
be registered with the SEC. Regulation D of the ’33 Act contains exemptions from the
registration requirements, allowing companies to offer and sell their securities without having
to register with the SEC. Of these exemptions, hedge funds typically rely on Rule 506, which
regulates solicitation or advertising of the securities and requires the securities be offered to
accredited investors.1 In doing so, funds are able to offer an unlimited amount of securities to
investors by filing a Form D indicating the sale. In filing the Form D, funds must disclose their
exemptions that enable them to avoid being defined as an “investment company” under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (’40 Act). Hedge funds primarily rely on two exemptions:
Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7). Under Section 3(c)(1), the issuer must not have more
than 100 investors and must only sell securities to accredited investors.2 Funds with more
than 100 investors must rely on the Section 3(c)(7) exemption which limits the fund to no
more than 500 investors and requires the more rigorous qualified purchaser standard.
In March of 2009, the SEC implemented amendments to Reg D, requiring an electronic
filing of the form.3
1For a more complete description of Rule 506, see:http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm.
2The accredited investor standard requires natural persons to have a liquid net worth of more than $1 million
or income of $200,000 or more in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse of $300,000
over each of the previous two years. The qualified purchaser standard requires a natural person to have
more than $5 million in investments or an investment manager to have more than $25 million in assets
under management.
3More complete analysis of the amended Reg D filing can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2008/33-8891fr.pdf) The fund is required to file the notice within 15 days after the first sale of securities,
is required to amend the filing when a material change has occurred, and annually thereafter.
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IA.2. Offshore jurisdictions and boards of directors
Hedge funds routinely create offshore vehicles for privacy and tax purposes.4 Managers
looking to attract U.S.-based investors will often choose to use a master/feeder structure. A
typical structure will consist of three entities: an onshore limited partnership feeder fund
through which U.S. taxable investors can enter the fund; an offshore feeder fund, typically
set up as an exempted corporation, through which non-U.S. and U.S. tax-exempt investors
can enter the fund; and an offshore corporate master fund through which all trading activity
is carried out.
For U.S. tax-exempt investors, the advantage of this approach is avoidance of Unrelated
Business Taxable Income (UBTI). Under U.S. tax law, a tax-exempt organization (such as
an ERISA-type retirement plan or endowment) that adopts an investment strategy where
leverage is used is liable for UBTI. In offshore locales, however, the fund is set up as an
exempted corporation rather than pass-through entity, such as a limited partnership. As such,
the tax does not pass through to the investor, thus removing the burden on U.S. tax-exempt
investors. For non-U.S. based investors, benefits include both possible tax-advantages from
the home country, as well as privacy from disclosure laws in the U.S. For example, if offshore
investors make any investments in U.S. securities, then U.S. withholding tax rules will apply
and U.S. forms will have to be filled out to claim exemption from U.S. withholding taxes.
The investors will have to submit these forms, which declares their participation, to U.S. tax
authorities. Alternatively, if the offshore fund is structured as a corporation, then only the
corporate entity will have to submit the paperwork, thus allowing its individual non-U.S.
investors to remain anonymous to U.S. tax authorities.
Among the hedge funds in our sample, the most common domicile for offshore hedge
funds is the Cayman Islands, which accounts for 79.6% of the sample. The next two largest
4Aragon, Liang, and Park (2014) study the differences in regulatory environment and investor clienteles
between onshore and offshore funds.
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domiciles are the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda, respectively. Collectively, these three
locales account for 91.4% of the offshore funds in our sample.
In the Cayman Islands, a fund typically creates a registered mutual fund and is subject
to the requirements of the Cayman Islands Mutual Fund Law.5 These requirements include
that the fund appoint at least two directors (in the Cayman Islands the two directors must
be natural persons i.e. not a corporate entity) that the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority
(CIMA) deems are fit and proper to be directors. Managers or officers of the fund are not
precluded from serving as a director. Upon review of CIMA, any director not believed capable
of fulfilling her duties may be forced to be replaced or the fund’s registration with CIMA
may be canceled. Non-CIMA registered funds in the Cayman Islands require only a single
director.
Other jurisdictions have similar but not identical regulations regarding directors. In the
British Virgin Islands, funds are only required to have one director, and the director does not
have to be a natural person. In Bermuda, one director must be a resident of Bermuda.
5Note that the term mutual fund is generic and is distinct from the typical U.S.-based interpretation of a
mutual fund. Further, while funds can avoid registration with CIMA by maintaining 15 or fewer accounts,
the majority of whom are capable of appointing or removing the fund’s operator, most funds fail to meet
this requirement and choose to register. See the 2012 Mutual Fund Law: http://www.cimoney.com.ky/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147483702
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